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questionably entitled to a fair and impartial
trial before a court of justice rather than in
the newspapers. It is unworthy the dignity
of a civilized community that there should be
an effort made by the press to bring extrane-
ous influences to bear upon the natural course
of justice. If the law, allowing the plea of
insanity as a defense to the charge of homi-
cide, stands in need of amendment (and we
are firmly of the opinion that it does), let
these blatant newspapers direct their efforts
towards a reform. For in the halls of legis-
lation their influence is legitimate and proper,
but the administration of justice should be
sacred from their encroachments.
POWERS OF PARTNERS.
II.
In considering the powers which a partner
possessed, it was stated in our former article,
that he could make a chattel mortgage to se-
cure a debt due from his firm. It becomes nec-.
essary to state, now that we are considering
the powers which he does not possess, that
he can not mortgage the partnership realty.I
And it makes no difference that the mortgage
was made to secure a pre-existing debt of the
firm, contracted within the scope of the part-
nership business. 2 In the case last cited it
was held that,while a mortgage on lands could
not be foreclosed as to the interest of any
person who had not executed it, or assented
to, or ratified it, yet it could be foreclosed as
to the interest of the person who executed it,
though in executing it he may have used the
partnership name, reciting that he was a mem-
ber of the firm. He could not deny that he
had an interest in the firm at the date of the
execution of the mortgage. It is also settled
that he can not make a chattel mortgage for
the purpose of securing his own private or in-
dividual debts. 3  And if he makes such a
mortgage, the other party will not take,
though ignorant at the time of the facts con-
stituting the illegality.4 It has also been held
that one partner can not mortgage his undi-
1 Tapley v. Butterfield, 1 Mete. 515; Arnold v. Stev-
enson, 2 Nev. 234.
2 Sutlive v. Jones, 61 Ga. 676.
8 Smith v. Andrews, 49 Ill. 28.
4 Binns v. Waddill, 32 Gratt. 638; Rogers v. Batch-
ellor, 12 Pet. 221.
vided interest in a specific part of the prop-
erty belonging to the firm.6
Attention was also called, while considering
the powers which partners possessed, to the
right of one partner to make and indorse
promissory notes, and also to accept bills
drawn on the firm. It remains to notice, as
among the powers which partners do not pos-
sess, that one partner can not, in the name of
the firm, make an accommodation indorse-
ment. 6 But one may be authorized by his co-
partners to make an accommodation indorse-
ment, and this authority may be shown by
parol. ¢ It is also settled that a partner can
not bind his copartner by signing as a surety
in the name of the partnership. 8 But author-
ity to bind a firm as sureties upon a note may
be established by evidence tending to show
that such authority had been habitually exer-
cised in previons transactions with the knowl-
edge of the copartner; and where such author-
ity did not previously exist, the action of the
partner in so signing may be afterwards rati-
fied. 9 On, partner has no power to bind his
copartners by the guaranty of the debt of
another,10 unless it is within the scope of the
partnership business. 1  Neither can he ac-
cept a bill, merely for the accommodation of
a third person.' 2  Nor can he bind the
firm by a promissory note made in the
firm name and for his individual debt,
the copartners not having assented there-
to, and the payee not being aware of
the consideration on which it is founded.1 3
6 Lovejoy v. Bowers, 11 N. H. 404.
6 Chenowith v. Chamberlain, 6 B. Mon. 61; Heffron
v. Hannaford. 40 Mich. 305; Bowman v. Cecil Bank,
3 Greene, 33; Lang's Heirs v. Waring, 17 Ala. 145;
Fielden v. Laniens, 2 Abb. Dec. 111.
7 Butler v. Stocking, 8 N. Y. 408.
8 Rollins v. Stevens, 31 Me. 454; Foot v. Sabin, 19
Johns. 154; Laverty v. Burr, 1 Wend. 529: Wilson v.
Williams, 14 Wend. 146; Bank of Vergenes v. Cam-
meron, 7 Barb. 143; Whitmur v. Adams, 17 rowa, 567;
Butterfield v. Heisley, 12 Gray, 226; Andrews v.
Planters' Bank, 7 S. & M. 192; Langen v. Hewitt, 13
S. & M. 122; Iyagnon v. Clay, :tMar. (Ky.) 257; Bank
v. Bowen, 7.Wend. 158.
9 First National Bank v. Breese, 39 Iova, 640.
10 First National Bank v. Carpenter, 34 Iowa, 433;
Selden v. Bank of Commerce, 3 Minn. 166; Suiton v.
ltwine, 12 S. & R. 13; Bamil v. Purvis, 2"P. & W.
177; Sweetser v. French, 2 Cush. 310, 314.
11 First National Bank of Dubuque v. Carpenter, 41
Iowa, 518.
12 Beach v. State Bank, 2 Ind. 488; Hibler v. DeFor-
rest, 6 Ala. 92.
13 Davenport v. Ruulett, 3 N. H. 386; Williams v.
Gilchrist, 11 N. H. 535; Mauldin v. Branch Bank at
Mobile, 2 Ala. 602; Pierce v. Pass, 1 Porter, 232,
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But a bonafide holder for value of negotiable
paper made by one partner for his individual
debt, can recover against the firm. "I One
partner can not promise to pay the debt of a
third person. 15 No principle of the law of
partnership can be considered better settled,
or as more generally known, than that one
partner can not bind his copartners by the
execution of a deed. 16 And it is equally well
settled that a deed executed by one partner
may bind the partnership, provided the part-
ner executing it was authorized by his copart-
ners, by parol, so to do; or provided they
have subsequently assented to the same. 17
So, when a deed is executed in the presence
of one partner and with his consent, it is his
deed. is So, where a lease of partnership
realty is made by one partner in the partner-
ship name, without the authority of the
copartner, and without his subsequent ratifi-
cation, it will not pass the interest of such co-
partner, although a seal may be unnecessary.' 9
The reason for this is the fact that as partners
they own the realty as tenants in common,
and as tenants in common they must devise it
as such, although it .may be regarded in
equity, for some purposes, as partnership
property. 20
In our former article we considered the
Knapp v. Norman, 7 Ala. 19; L. F. & M. Ins. Co. v.
Treat, 58 Me. 415; Chazourues v. Edwards, 3 Pick. 5;
Viles v. Bangs, 36 Wis. 131; Colzhausen v. Judd, 43
Wis. 213; Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300; Dob v.
Halsey. 16 Johns. 34; Saylor v. Macklin, 9 Iowa, 209;
Todd v. Lorah, 75 Pa. St. 155.
14 Waldo Bank v. Lambert, 16 Me. 416; Emerson v.
Harmon, 14 Me. 271; Dudley v. Littlefield, 21 Me. 418;
Monroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412; First. National Bank v.
Morgan, 73 N. Y. 593; Blodgett v. Weed, 119 Mass.
:215.
2. Mo Quewans v. Hanil, 35 Pa. St. 517.
14 Morgan v. Scott, Minor, 81; Doe v. Tupper, 4
S. & M. 261; Shirley v. Fearne, 33 Miss. 653; Lucas v.
Banik of Darien, 2 Stew. 280; Hart v. Withers, 1 P. &
W. 285; Massey v. Pike, 20 Ark. 92; Posey v. Bullitt.
1 Blackf. 99; Bent v. Lierlein, 4 Mo. 417; Henry Coun-
ty v. Gates, 26 Mo. 315; Trimble v. Coons, 2 Mar. 376;
Druiright v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424; Morse v. Billew, 7
N. H. 556; Clement v. Brush. 3 Johns. Cas. 180; Van
Duesen v. Blum, 18 Pick. 229; Morris v. Jones, 4
Harr. 428; Cummins v. Cassily, 5 B. Mon. 74; Mun-
nely v. Doherty, 1 Yerger, 26.
17 McCart v. Lewis, 2 B. Mon. 266; Bond v. Aitkin,
6 W. & S. 165; Cady v. Shepard, 11 Pick. 400; Pike v.
Bacon, 21 Me. 280; McDonald v. Eggleston, 26 Vt. 154;
Smith v. Kerr, 3 N. Y. 144, 150; Skinner v. Dayton, 19
Johns. 513; Herbert v. Hanrick, 16 Ala. 581; Grady
v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 289; Gunter v. Williams, 40 Ala.
61; Drumright v. Philpot, 16 Ga. 424.
18 Lee v. Onstott, 1 Ark. 206.
19 Dillon v. Brown, 11 Gray, 179.
20 In note 40 the cases were collected.
fact that the admissions made by one partner,
while acting within the scope of the partner-
ship business, were competent evidence against
the firm; and now in coming to the consider-
ation of the effect which a dissolution of the
partnership has upon the power of partners,
the question which arises is, whether one
partner can, after the dissolution of tile part-
nership, by a promise or an admission, take a
case out of the statute of limitations as against
his copartners. While there has been a di-
versity of opinion in relation to this question,
it has finally become settled, if a large pre-
ponderance of the latest authorities can settle
it, that one partner has no such power as
against the other. This is the view which the
Supreme Court of the United States has taken
of the subject, and it prevails in a lqrge num-
ber of the States. 21 In a very able opinion
recently announced in New Jersey, Chief Jus-
tice Beasley giving the decision, the contrary
doctrine is enunciated. 22 After showing by
a thorough examination of the authorities
that the conclusion reached by him was the
rule established by a long series of cases,
covering a long period of time, and sanc-
tioned by a long line of English and Amer-
ican jurists of the very highest eminence,
he declares that the overthrow of it by
judi~ial action is arbitrary and unjustifiable,
and does much to shake the confidence of the
people in the stability of legal rules. "If
partners have ceased to be such by the act of
dissolution, and can no longer bind each other
in that capacity, they are still joint debtors,
and from that connection they are the agents
of each other in making payments, and re-
newing the promise to pay, so as to avoid the
effect of the statute of limitations." This
doctrine is sustained in the cases cited be-
low. 23 It has been changed by statute in
21 Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 361, 370; Newman v.
McComas, 43 Md. 70; Tate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339;
Yandes v. LeFavour, 2 Blackf. 371; Kirk v. Hiatt, 2
Ind. 322; Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124; Speake
v. White, 14 Tex. 369; Peet v. O'Brien, 5 Neb. 360;
Whitney v. Reese, 11 Minn. 138; Steele v. Jennings,
1 McMullen, 297; Belote's Exr's. v. Wynne, 7 Yerg.
534; Muse v.Donaldson, 2 Humiph.166; Helm v.Cantrell,
69 Ill. 524; Van Keuren v. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523;
Shoemaker v. Benedict, 11 N. Y. 176; Wilson v. Tor-
bet, 3 Stew. 296; Myatt v. Bell, 41 Ala. 222; Levy Y.
Cadet, 17 S. & R. 126; Searight v. Craighead, 1 P. &
W. 135.
22 Merritt v. Day, 38 N. J. Law, 32.
23 Whitcomb v. Whiting, Doug. 652; 'Wood v.
Braddick, 1 Taunton, 104; Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick.
400; Vinal v. Burrill, 16 Pick. 401; Sigourney v. Dru-
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Maine, 24 Massachusetts, 25 and in Vermont. 2 6
The case last cited is an interesting one. It
was there held that if a, partner, who is the
agent of a firm in making disbursements,
makes a payment as such agent, upon a prom-
issory note previously given by the firm, it
prevents the running of the statute as against
all the partners, notwithstanding a provision
in the statute that a payment by one joint
contractor is not allowed to prevent the run-
ning of the statute as against the other.
"This," said the court, "is not to be treated
as a case where a payment is made by an in-
dividual member of a firm, but it was a pay-
ment by the entire firm, gn their joint account,
and out of their joint fund."
It is important to notice the effect which a
dissolution of the partnership has upon the
power of the partners to make and negotiate
commercial paper. After dissolution of the
partnership, one partner can not give a note
in the name of the firm, even for a pre-exist-
ing debt. 27 And if a note has been executed
by one partner, in the name of the partner-
ship, and for a partnership debt, but has not
been delivered by him until after the dissolu-
tion of the firm, it can not bind the partner-
ship, as it can take effect only from delivery,
and no authority exists to make the delivery
after dissolution. 28 So, after dissolution, no
power to indorse a note, in the name of the
firm, exists in either partner. 29 But if the
indorsee had no notice of the dissolution of
the partnership, and took the note in igno-
rance of that fact, it has been held that he
acquires a valid title to the instrument, and
that the firm is answerable thereon. 30 And
the same principle holds where the note has
ry, 14 Pick. 1387; Bound v. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 363;
Shepley v. Waterhouse. 22 Mle. 497; Wheelock v. Doo-
little, 18 Vermont, 440; Melntire v. Oliver, 2 Hawks,
209; Brewster v. Hardman, Dudley, 138; Smith v.
Ludlow, 6 Johns. 267; Johnson v. Beardsley, 15 Johns.
3; Patterson v. Choate, 7 Wend. 441.
24 See True v. Andrews, 35 Mle. 183; Wellman v.
Southara, 30 Me. 425.
25 See Peirce v. Tobey. 5 Met. 168.
26 See Carlton v. Mill, 28 Vt. 504.
27 Woodworth v. Downer, 13 Vt. 522; Parker v.
Cousins, 2 Gratt. 372; Burr v. Williams, 20 Ark. 172;
Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300; Montague v. Reakert,
6 Bush, 393; Whitman v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177.
28 Woodford v. Dorwin, 3 Vt. 82; Parker v. Macom-
ber, 18 Pick. 505; Gale v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 536; Grass-
witt's Assignee v. Connally, 27 Gratt. 19.
29 Bryant v. Lord, 19 Minn. 396; McDaniel v. Wood,
7 Mo. 543.
30 Cony v. Wheelock, 33 Ale. 366.
been executed after dissolution, but the payee
received 'the note without knowledge of this
fact. 31 Not only is a partner unable to make
a note which may evidence a pre-existing in-
debtedness, but he can not make a new note
for the purpose of renewing an old one. 32
But in a case decided in Missouri, it was held,
where the holder of the firm note had agreed
with the partnership that the note should be
renewed upon part payment at maturity, and
a new note given for the balance, that such a
note might be given after dissolution by one
of the partners in the name of the partner-
ship. 33 And one partner may, after dissolu-
tion, negotiate a note in the name of the firm,
provided he has been authorized by his co-
partners so to do; and such authority may be
given by parol. 34 But upon the dissolution
of a partnership, it frequently happens that
the copartners designate one of their number
a special agent for winding up the affairs of
the firm. When this is done, the question
arises whether the liquidating partner is there-
by clothed with authority to execute notes, to
renew them, or to bind the firm by an in-
dorsement. The rule upon this subject seems
to be that he is not so authorized, unless the
power is expressly conferred upon him. It
has been held that he can not execute a note
in the firm name for a pre-existing indebted-
ness ; 35 that he can not renew a note; 36 that
he can not bind the firm by an indorsement.7
And in a case in Nebraska, it is said that after
dissolution, no valid draft, acceptance or in-
dorsement can be made by the firm; and it is
no authority to do so, if, in the notice of dis-
solution, any partner is empowered to receive
and pay debts of the firm; that it must be
done by all of the partners, or one must be
especially empowered todo the act. 38
In Pennsylvania it has been held that after
31 Dickinson v. Dickinson, 25 Gratt. 321; Taylor v.
Hill, 36 Md. 494.
32 Wilson v. Forder, 20 Ohio St. 95; Merritt v. Pollys,
16 B. Mon. 356; Cunningham v. Bragg, 37 Ala. 436.
33 Richardson v. Moies, 31 Mo. 430.
34 Yale v. Eames, 1 Metcalf, 486.
35 Van Valkenburg v. Bradley, 14 Iowa, 108; Kemp
v.Coflin,3 Greene, 190 (being overruled); Hamilton v.
Seaman, 1 Ind. 185; Conklin v. Oghorn, 7 Ind. 553;
Perrin v. Keene, 19 Me. 355; White v. Tudor, 24 Tex-
as, 639.
36 Palmer v. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21; National Bank v.
Norton, 1 Hill, 572; White v. Tudor, 24' Texas, 639;
Lumberman's Bank v. Pratt, 51 Me. 563.
07 Sanford v. Mlckles, 4 Johns. 224-.
38 Mayberry v. Willoughby, 5 Neb. 368.
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dissolution the liquidating partner can borrow
money, on the credit of the late firm, for the
purpose of paying its debts. 39 It is held in
the same State that the liquidating partner can
renew an accommodation indorsement, 40 and
that he can bind his copartners by notes in
liquidation. 41 It has been held that the power
to indorse notes and bills of the firm exists for
the purpose of settling up the business of the
firm. 42 An indorsement made without author-
ity is ratified where the copartner retains his
share of the proceeds of the note with a full
knowledge of the facts of the case. 43 In a
case in Maine it is said that after dissolution
each member has the same power as before to
collect, liquidate and settle accounts, and ap-
ply the funds and effects to the payment of
debts, this power continuing until the concerns
of the partnership are closed up. 44
The rule is that, after the dissolution of a
partnership, one partner can not incur any
new responsibility in the name of the firm by
entering into any new contract whatsoever. 45
Upon dissolution, in the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary, each may collect debts
and receipt for them. 46 And one partner can
release a debt, after dissolution, that is due to
the firm.' 7 So he may lawfully assign to a
creditor of the firm a demand due to the part-
nership. 48  One partner, after dissolution,
can transfer or assign a judgment obtained
by the partnership, and the title will vest as
against his copartner; but he can not bind
him by a covenant contained in the assign-
ment that the whole judgment remained un-
paid. 49 If one partner, on dissolution of the
W Davis' Estate, 5 Whart. 530; Whitehead>'. Bank
of Piltsburgh, 2 W. & S. 172; McCowin v. Cubbison,
72 Pa. St. 358; Brown v. Clark, 14 Pa. St. 469; Robin-
son v. Taylor, 4 Pa. St. 242.
4o McCowin v. Cubbison, 72 Pa. St. 358.
41 Ward v. Tyler, 52 Pa. St. 393.
42 Chappell v. Allen, 38 Mo. 213.
43 First National Bank of Mankato v. Parsons, 19
Minn. 289.
44 Milliken v. Loring, 37 Me. 408; Knowlton v. Reed,
38 Me. 246.
45 Bacon v. Hutchings, 5 Bush, 597; Easter v. Farm-
ers' National Bank, 57 I1. 215; Helm v. Cantrell, 59
iII. 524; Dunlop v. Limes, 49 Iowa, 178; Simmons v.
Curtis, 41 Me. 373; Perrin v. Keene, 19 Me. 355; Hicks
v. Russell, 72 Il. 230; Mauney v. Coilt, 80 N. C. 300;
Sanders v. Ward, 23 Ark. 242.
46 Heartt v. Walsh, 75 Ill. 200; Hilton v. Vander-
bilt, 82 N. Y. 591; Robbins v. Fuller, 24 X. Y. 570;
Gillilan v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 876.
47 Morse v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 549; Torrey v. Baxter,
37 Vt. 578.
48 Milliken v. Loring, 37 Me. 408.
49 Bennett V. Buchan, 01 N. Y. 225.
firm, assigns all his interest in the book debts
and demands to his copartner, with power to
collect them for his own benefit, he can not
afterwards exercise any control over them.50
But the fact that one partner is insolvent will
not prevent him from collecting the firm debts,
after dissolution. 51 It seems to be agreed
that while each partner has authority to settle
partnership debts, yet if it is agreed, upon
dissolution, that one partner surrenders this
right to his copartner, and one who has notice
of this agreement afterwards settles with the
partner who surrendered his right to settle,
the settlement is not binding on the copart-
ner.52 Third parties settling with other than
the liquidating partner, and having notice, are
subject to the equitable rights of the other
partner.53 But if made in good faith, it was
held in Vermont that payment to one part-
ner, even against tile prohibition of the other,
operated as paymert of the debt.5 4 After a
dissolution of the partnership, one partner
can not hind the other by a promise to pay a
note indorsed by the firm, but from which
they have been discharged by want of notice
of non-payment35 And in a recent case in
North Carolina it has been held that, after
dissolution, one partner has no authority to
waive protest of paper indorsed by the firm.5
And admissions made by one partner after
dissolution are held not conclusive upon the
partnerslip.57  But declarations made by one
partner after dissolution, concerning facts
which transpired during the existence of the
partnership, and in the regular course of its
business, are admissible as against the firm,
provided they do not create a new liability.58
One member of a dissolved partnership has
no authority, unless it has been expressly
given, to retain an attorney to defend the
other members of the late firm, in a suit
50 Davis v. Briggs, 39 Me. 304.
61 Heartt v. Walsh, 75 Ill. 200.
52 Combs v. Boswell, 1 Dana, 475; Clark v. Reed,
31 Leg. Int. 413.
63 Hilton v. Vanderbilt, 82 N. Y. 591.
51 Thrall v. Seward, 37 Vt. 573.
55 Schoneman v. Fegley, 7 Pa. St. 433.
5G Mauney v. Colt, 80 N. C. 300.
67 Flowers v. Helm, 29 Mo. 324; Brady v. Hill, 1
Mo. 315; Taylor v. Hillyer, 3 Blackf. 433; Beatty v
Arabs, 11 Minn. 331.
08Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 305,338; Mann v. Locke,
11 N. H. 246; Curry v. Kurtz, 33 Miss. 24; Loomis v.
Loomis, 26 Vt. 198; Hlinkley v. Gilligan, 34 Me. 101;
Parker v. Merrill, 6 Me. 41.
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brought against the partnership. 59 In a case
in Iowa it has been held that one partner, af-
ter dissolution, is authorized to defend, in the
name of the partnership, a suit against the
firm, to appeal from the judgment, and to
procure sureties on an appeal bond necessary
to that end.60 In the same State it was held,
where, upon dissolution of a copartnership,
it was stipulated that all unsettled business
should be entrusted to one of the partners,
and by him arranged for their joint benefit in
the same manner as if the firm continued to
exist, with power to execute all contracts,
and perform all duties necessary to the set-
tlement of its affairs, that such partner could
not maintain an action in his own name to re-
cover a debt due to the firm. 61 In a case in
Pennsylvania it was held that one partner, on
the eve of dissolution, had no power to dis-
pose of the entire property of the firm, and
especially when its continued ownership was
essential to the prosecution of the business,'
and that he would be restrained by injunction
from so doing.62 It is settled that, whenever
one partner gives actual notice that lie will
not be holden as partner, lie can not
thereafter be bound for debts contracted by
his copartner. 63 A partnership is not bound
by acts of another partnership having a com-
mon member. 61 HENRY WADE RoGERS.
Pennington, N. J.
59 Hall v. Lanning, 1 Otto, 160; Bowler v. Houston,
30 Gratt. 266.
60 Gard v. Clark, 29 Iowa, 189.
61 Sypher v. Savery, 39 Iowa, 258.
62 Sloan v. Moore, 37 Pa. St. 217.
63 Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178; Feigley v. Spone-
bereer, 5 W. & S. 564; Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Coln. 125,
128.
04 Cobb v. 1. C. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 610.
THE RIGHT TO MANACLE PRISONERS.
The questioa of the right to manacle pris-
oners, which arose before the Commission of
Oyer and Terminer on Wednesday last, is one
that has not frequently been the occasion of
controversy in modern times. It may, how-
ever, occur at various stages of the prisoner's
custody-at the time of his arrest, of his com-
mittal to gaol,and of his appearing at the bar;
and a few words upon the law applicable to
each of those contingencies may here be use-
ful.
In the first place, as regards the arrest, we
consider that ordinarily, and not merely when
the apprehension takes place on mere sus-
picion (as laid down by 3Mr. Levinge, "Jus-
tice of the Peace"), an unconvicted prisoner
ought not to be manacled, unless there is
reasonable ground to fear an attempt at es-
cape or rescue; and if without reasonable
grounds the prisoner is manacled, the con-
stable would seem to be liable to an action
for assault. 1 Neither,in the dubious interval
between the commitment and trial, should. the
prisoner be loaded with needless fetters;2
and if the gaoler shall imprison a man so
straightly by putting him in stocks, or put-
ting more irons upon him than is needful, an
action will lie against the gaoler.3
Lastly, as to the trial at bar, we apprehend
that the prisoner ought not to be hand-cuffed.
This question arose in 1867, when the prison-
ers charged with the Fenian outrage at Man-
chester were brought in fetters before the
police court, when their counsel, Mr. Ernest
Jones, having failed in his peremotory de-
mand for the removal of the manacles, went
so far as to throw up his brief. 4 But, in our
opinion, such a demand could not be insisted
upon as of right. That the prisoner ought to
be unshackled we doubt not; the custom is
so; but it is a matter lying within the
discretion of the court. In State v. Kring,5
indeed, where the prisoner, having on a
former trial assaulted a bystander, was
brought int6 court the second time ironed
upon his wrists, and the court refused
to order the removal of the irons, Bake-
well, J., said: "It was no sufficient rea-
son for compelling the prisoner to stand
his trial for his life with gyves upon his wrists
and his hands bound together.. Officers of
the court could have been placed around him
if he was considered dangerous to by-stand-
ers, or he might have been placed in an en-
closed space within the bar of the court, as
was the English custom. Any proper precau-
1 Wright v. Court, 4 B. & C. 596; Griffin v. Coleman,
4 H. & N. 265; Smith v. Brears and Beach, 1 Ir. L. T.
611; 2 Hale P. C. 219.
2Fleta, Lib. e. 26; Mirror, e. 5, s. 1, n. 54; 4 B1.
Com. 800; 1 Rol. 807, 1; 2 Inst. 8S1; 1 Hale, P. C. 601;
2 Hawk. c. 22, s. 32.
3 Fitz. H. Nat. Brev. 93; Dalton, c. 170, s. 18; 1 Ed.
III., St. 1, c. 7; 14 Ed. III., St. 1, c. 10; 17 St. Tr.
453.
4 See1 Ir. L. T. 603,
b 1 Mo. App. 489, affirmed 64 Mo. 591.
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